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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
 
 
This report details the results of an analysis of the potential cost implications of 
proposed changes to aspects of the model of delivery of publicly-financed dental 
services in Ireland, as set out in the new National Oral Health Policy (Department 
of Health, 2018b). Currently, dental services in Ireland are financed and delivered 
in a mixed public-private system, with most individuals paying out-of-pocket fees 
to independent dental practitioners. The public system currently finances the 
delivery of dental healthcare services to adult medical cardholders via the Dental 
Treatment Services Scheme (DTSS); to non-medical cardholder eligible adults via 
the Treatment Benefit Scheme (TBS); and to children and adults requiring special 
and complex care via the Public Dental Service (PDS). This report deals with 
proposed changes to the delivery of preventive dental healthcare services under 
the DTSS and PDS.  
 
One of the key provisions of the new National Oral Health Policy is to provide 
packages of preventive dental healthcare services for two key population groups 
(i.e. eligible adults with Medical Cards, and children). For both adult medical 
cardholders and children, the scope of publicly-financed services available will 
change, while the delivery setting will also change for children, from the public 
dental service to independent practice. Dentists in independent practice will also 
face a change in reimbursement method, from fee-for-service to prospective 
payment for specified packages of preventive dental healthcare services. This 
report reviews the literature on methods of provider payment for primary care 
and dental services, and assesses the implications for public expenditure of 
proposed changes to the delivery of services to these two population groups.  
 
The review of the theoretical and empirical literature on provider payment 
methods in primary care and dentistry highlights that the optimal mix between 
the main methods of provider payment – namely capitation, fee-for-service and 
salary – is still undecided. The choice of payment method in part depends on the 
importance of different policy priorities such as access, efficiency and quality. 
New payment initiatives such as pay for performance (P4P) are being 
implemented in many countries, but their success is dependent on the accuracy 
with which outcomes can be measured. Many countries are now experimenting 
with bundled payment initiatives, mainly in acute care settings, although these 
initiatives have not yet been subject to rigorous evaluations of their impacts on 
efficiency, access, quality and patient health outcomes.  
 
While it is difficult to predict how dentists will respond to the changes in 
reimbursement proposed under the National Oral Health Policy, to the extent that 
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the mix of services reimbursable in the public system will now change, this may be 
expected to result in differences in the mix of services provided by dentists. In 
addition, for the provision of services to adult medical cardholders, the movement 
from fee-for-service to prospective payment will change provider incentives, 
although the full impact of the change is difficult to predict without also 
considering how patients will react. In any case, under the National Oral Health 
Policy, dentists will (continue to) face different payment methods for different 
services and different population groups, and the full implications of these 
different payment methods and resulting incentives will need to be monitored 
carefully in the implementation of the new policy. 
 
The assessment of the expenditure implications of alternative preventive dental 
healthcare packages results in a range of annual expenditure figures for both 
adult medical cardholders and children. The annual cost of a package of care 
under the baseline scenario for adult medical cardholders is estimated to be €23.0 
million, with estimates under alternative scenarios ranging from €6.9 million to 
€42.8 million. Annual expenditure for the provision of a primary dental care 
service to all children under the age of 16 years is estimated to be €26.5 million, 
with estimates under alternative scenarios ranging from €26.0 million to €41.1 
million. The range of estimates reflects differing assumptions about the scope of 
services available (e.g. allowance for extractions), eligible population (e.g. relevant 
population for fluoride therapy) and usage frequency (e.g. annual vs. biennial oral 
examinations), and illustrates the sensitivity of cost estimates to differences in key 
policy parameters. 
 
This range of estimates is designed to assist policymakers tasked with designing 
an alternative package of preventive dental healthcare services, and associated 
provider payment structure, for adult medical cardholders and children 
respectively. Further analysis of the capacity (i.e. staff, equipment, etc.) 
implications, potential behaviour change on the part of both providers and 
patients, as well as estimates of the cost of additional packages of services to 
cover more complex interventions such as crowns, endodontic treatment, etc. will 
be required in order to assess the full implications of the proposed policy changes 
for public dental expenditure, practice and outcomes in Ireland. 
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CHAPTER 1  
 
Introduction 
 
This report details the results of an analysis of the potential cost implications of 
proposed changes to aspects of the model of delivery of publicly-financed dental 
services in Ireland, as set out in the new National Oral Health Policy (Department 
of Health, 2018b). This research was carried out as part of a programme of 
research at the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) funded by the 
Department of Health. The ESRI Research Programme on Healthcare Reform was 
agreed between the ESRI and the Department of Health in July 2014. The 
objectives of the programme are to apply economic analysis to explore issues in 
relation to health services, health expenditure and population health, in order to 
inform the development of health policy. The programme is overseen by a 
Steering Group comprising nominees of the ESRI and the Department of Health, 
which agrees its annual work programme.1 
 
Currently, dental services in Ireland are financed and delivered in a mixed public-
private system. Services are financed largely by out-of-pocket payments by 
individuals to dental practitioners operating in independent practice. The Central 
Statistics Office (CSO) estimates that a total of €603 million was paid to dental 
practitioners for dental services in 2015, of which 83 per cent was accounted for 
by direct out-of-pocket payments by individuals (CSO, 2017). The public system 
currently finances the delivery of dental healthcare services to adult medical 
cardholders via the Dental Treatment Services Scheme (DTSS), to non-medical 
cardholder eligible adults via the Treatment Benefit Scheme (TBS), and to children 
and adults requiring special and complex care via the Public Dental Service (PDS).  
 
The National Oral Health Policy replaces the existing Dental Health Action Plan, 
which dates back to 1994 (Department of Health, 1994). One of the key provisions 
of the new policy is to establish a re-orientated public service for two key 
population groups (i.e. eligible adults with Medical Cards, and children) 
(Department of Health, 2018b). In this report, we assess the implications for 
public expenditure of these proposed changes to the delivery of services to these 
two population groups. A range of scenarios is examined for each population 
group, highlighting the potential trade-offs involved in the design of alternative 
packages of dental healthcare services. As the proposed changes to the delivery 
models involve changing the method of remunerating dentists for services 
 
                                                          
 
1  To date, the programme has examined issues such as universal health insurance (Wren et al., 2015) and projections 
of demand for healthcare up to 2030 (Wren et al., 2017). 
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provided to these two population groups, the report also contains a review of the 
literature on methods of provider payment for dental services. 
 
This report is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief description of the 
Irish healthcare system, describes current policy with regard to dental healthcare 
in Ireland, and outlines the current financing and delivery of dental healthcare 
services for both adults and children. Section 3 reviews the literature on methods 
for reimbursing dentists for the provision of dental healthcare services, with a 
particular focus on emerging methods of provider payment such as bundled 
methods of payment. Sections 4 and 5 then assess the public expenditure 
implications of the proposed changes to the delivery of dental healthcare services 
to adult medical cardholders and children respectively. Section 6 discusses the 
findings from the analysis and further implications for policy. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Background 
2.1 IRISH HEALTHCARE SYSTEM 
In 2015, Ireland spent €3,939 per capita on healthcare (9.7 per cent of gross 
national income), compared to the EU average of €2,797.2 Approximately 70 per 
cent of this spending is publicly-funded, with the remainder largely funded from 
out-of-pocket payments (15 per cent) and voluntary health insurance payments 
(12 per cent) (OECD, 2018). Healthcare services are delivered in both the public 
and private sectors, and many publicly-funded health services are delivered by 
self-employed providers (e.g. general practitioners, dentists, etc.).  
Currently, there are two main categories of entitlements to public health services. 
Those in Category I (medical cardholders) are entitled to free public health 
services (including inpatient and outpatient hospital care, general practitioner 
(GP) care and other primary and community care services).3 Those in Category II 
are entitled to subsidised public hospital services and prescription medicines, but 
must pay the full cost of primary and community care services. There are 
additional public services available for children (e.g. childhood immunisations, 
some dental, ophthalmic and aural services), and additional entitlements for 
individuals in special circumstances.4 Eligibility for a Medical Card is assessed 
primarily on the basis of an income means test, and approximately 35 per cent of 
the population has a Medical Card (Department of Health, 2018a). Currently 
approximately 45 per cent of the population have private health insurance (PHI), 
which mainly provides coverage for private or semi-private acute hospital 
services, but which increasingly offers partial reimbursement of certain primary 
care expenses (e.g. GP visits, routine dental care, physiotherapy, etc.) (Health 
Insurance Authority, 2018). 
2.2 FINANCING AND DELIVERY OF DENTAL HEALTHCARE SERVICES 
Prior to the publication of the National Oral Health Policy, policy on the provision 
of dental services in Ireland was based on the 1994 Dental Health Action Plan 
(Department of Health, 1994). One of the major components of the plan was the 
provision for the establishment of the Dental Treatment Services Scheme (DTSS). 
2 Caution is advised in making international comparisons using these data. In particular, there are differences in how 
countries categorise their social and long-term care spending and Ireland adopts a particularly inclusive definition 
(Wren et al., 2017). 
3 They must pay a co-payment of €2 per prescription item, up to a maximum of €20 per family per month. 
4 For example, those with certain diagnosed conditions (e.g. diabetes) may be eligible for free pharmaceuticals under 
the Long Term Illness Scheme, and all those under 6, over 70 and with low incomes (but not low enough to qualify for 
a Medical Card) are entitled to a GP visit card, which provides free GP care. 
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At that time (November 1994), the responsibility for providing a dental treatment 
service to medical cardholders was transferred from publicly-employed dentists to 
the independent dental sector. The provision of routine dental treatment was 
available initially to those aged 65+ only, with emergency treatment available for 
other eligible age groups (Department of Health, 1994; 1999). The next phase of 
the extension of the DTSS in 1996 provided for routine dental treatment for those 
aged 16-34, and the provision of full dentures to all medical cardholders without 
any natural teeth. The extension of routine treatment to the remainder of the 
eligible Medical Card population was introduced in 1999 (Department of Health, 
1999). 
Under the DTSS, the Health Service Executive (HSE) provides free dental 
treatment and appliances to adult medical cardholders and their dependants. 
Dentists are reimbursed on a fee-per-item basis for DTSS services provided to 
eligible medical cardholders. These payments are administered by the Primary 
Care Reimbursement Service (PCRS) unit of the HSE. In 2015, payments to dentists 
for the provision of dental services and appliances under the DTSS totalled 
€66.4 million (PCRS, 2016b). ‘Above-the-line’ procedures, such as oral 
examinations and relatively simple fillings or restorations can be completed 
without prior approval of the HSE (albeit with restrictions on the frequency of 
treatment, e.g. one oral examination per calendar year). Prior approval is required 
from the HSE for all treatment procedures ‘below-the-line’ (e.g. prosthetics).5 In 
2015, a total of 1.3 million adults aged 16+ were eligible for a Medical Card and of 
these, 30.9 per cent had availed of at least one ‘above-the-line’ treatment in 2015 
(PCRS, 2016a; 2016b). Fee reductions were imposed under the Financial 
Emergency Measures in the Public Interest Act in 2009, 2011 and 2012 
(Department of Health, 2011; Government of Ireland, 2009; 2011; 2012). From 
April 2010, a number of restrictions were introduced to the DTSS in order to 
maintain expenditure on the scheme, including the suspension of prophylaxis 
(cleaning) treatments.6 A network of 1,847 self-employed dentists had 
agreements with the PCRS to provide services under the DTSS in 2015.7  
For adults (those without Medical Cards), limited dental treatment is available 
under the Treatment Benefit Scheme (TBS), administered by the Department of 
Employment Affairs and Social Protection. The TBS provides for an annual 
examination and prophylaxis for adults who have the required number of pay 
5 See Sections 5.4 and 5.5 of PCRS (2018) for the full list of above-the-line and below-the-line treatments reimbursed 
under the DTSS. 
6 http://www.hse.ie/eng/staff/PCRS/circulars/Dental/Dental%20Treatment%20Services%20Scheme%20Budget.pdf 
[last accessed 7 September 2018]. Since then, prophylaxis treatments have been made available after prior approval, 
or without prior approval for certain patient groups (e.g. diabetics) (PCRS, 2018). 
7 This figure includes 184 dentists who were employed by the HSE and provided services under the DTSS (PCRS, 
2016b). 
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related social insurance (PRSI) contributions.8 In 2015, expenditure on dental 
treatment under the TBS amounted to €16.6 million, and a total of 477,658 claims 
were registered (Department of Social Protection, 2016).9 
The 1994 Dental Health Action Plan also set out the remit for the PDS. Currently, 
the PDS provides dental care to children, in addition to services to persons of all 
ages with special needs (e.g. those receiving care for intellectual disabilities). In 
2015, total expenditure on the PDS amounted to approximately €70 million 
(Department of Health, 2016). At present, it is estimated that 90 per cent of the 
activity of the PDS relates to the provision of services to children, with the 
remaining 10 per cent accounted for by special care services.10 The provision of 
services to children under the PDS is a school-based approach, with three child 
dental assessments provided to children between the ages of 5 and 12 (i.e. in 
primary school), at which stage referral to orthodontic care may be made. In 
addition, the PDS also provides an emergency service for all children. Under the 
current service, emergency treatment is generally the only publicly-funded service 
available for pre-school children (Staines et al., 2016). These services are provided 
by dentists employed on a salary basis by the HSE in premises owned by the HSE 
(331 whole-time equivalents as of December 2015) (HSE, 2018). 
2.3 DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL ORAL HEALTH POLICY 
It is clear therefore that publicly-financed dental services for children, adults and 
vulnerable groups provide different levels of care in different locations under 
different schemes and provider payment methods. This system results in gaps in 
publicly-financed routine care for significant cohorts of the population, including 
the very young (Staines et al., 2016). One of the key provisions of the new 
National Oral Health Policy is to establish a re-orientated public dental service for 
adults with Medical Cards and for children, with a particular focus on the 
provision of packages of preventive dental care services throughout the life 
course (Department of Health, 2018b). 
The National Oral Health Policy was developed by the Department of Health. In 
addition to research input by the ESRI, development of the policy was informed by 
the work of an independent panel with expertise in the areas of oral health 
services development, and epidemiological, social and economic research. In 
addition, an Oral Health Policy Academic Reference Group reviewed the current 
system of dental delivery in Ireland and the national and international literature 
8 The scope of services available to eligible individuals has changed in recent years. For example, Budget 2010 removed 
the entitlement to one free prophylaxis per calendar year, and this was partially restored in Budget 2018 (each 
eligible individual now receives a contribution of €42 towards the cost of one prophylaxis per calendar year). See 
www.citizensinformation.ie/en/social_welfare/social_welfare_payments/disability_and_illness/treatment_benefit_s
cheme.html [last accessed 7 September 2018]. 
9 It is not clear if the data on claims refer to unique claimants or simply the total number of claims submitted in that 
year. 
10 Department of Health personal communication, 20 September 2017. 
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on models of dental delivery (including for special circumstances such as for those 
in residential care settings, rural or remote settings and marginalised groups) 
(Woods and Ahern, 2016; Oral Health Policy Academic Reference Group, 2016).11 
A consultation process was also undertaken, as was a qualitative analysis of 
interviews with dental healthcare service providers.  
The results of the analyses in this report – reviewing the evidence on methods of 
provider payment in dental care (with a particular focus on emerging methods of 
provider payment such as bundled methods of payment), and costing the 
proposed alternative models of delivery of dental care services to adult medical 
cardholders and children – also informed the development of the policy. 
Specifically, three key research questions are examined in this report, namely: 
1. What is the national and international evidence on the effects of different
methods of provider payment on dental healthcare provision and outcomes?
2. What is the estimated cost per annum of providing alternative packages of
primary dental healthcare services to all adult medical cardholders?
3. What is the estimated cost per annum of providing alternative packages of
primary dental healthcare services to all children aged 0-16?
The following sections present the results of the analyses of each of these three 
questions in turn.  
The cost analysis was conducted, in line with best practice, to assist the 
Department of Health in assessing the feasibility and affordability of the 
recommendations outlined in the new National Oral Health Policy and in 
ascertaining the parameters which are likely to have the largest impact on cost. 
While a number of alternative scenarios have been examined and a number of 
assumptions have been made to facilitate this analysis, this analysis is not an end 
in itself and it is not intended to draw conclusions about the anticipated final cost 
of the publicly-funded schemes of the new National Oral Health Policy. 
In addition, it is important to note that the costing analysis focuses on two key 
components of the proposed re-orientation of publicly-financed dental healthcare 
services in Ireland, namely the provision of preventive dental healthcare to adult 
medical cardholders and to children. The cost of providing other publicly-financed 
services, such as curative or complex care services, including for other population 
groups, is not considered in this report (although the implications of the findings 
for the provision of dental healthcare services to the full population are discussed 
in Section 6).  
11 See https://health.gov.ie/future-health/reforming-primary-care-2/national-oral-health-policy/ for further details [last 
accessed 7 September 2018]. 
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CHAPTER 3  
 
Provider payment methods – literature review 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this section we are concerned with payments to providers, and how the 
financial incentives inherent in different methods of provider payment can help to 
achieve health policy objectives, e.g. improving population health, making the 
healthcare system more efficient, effective, equitable, patient-centred, etc. 
Financial incentives are extrinsic sources of motivation and exist when an 
individual receives a monetary transfer which is made conditional on acting in a 
particular way. Intrinsic sources of motivation for healthcare providers include the 
likelihood that patients’ health will improve as a result of a course of action, and 
motivation from performing a task well. Other sources of motivation include 
social and peer group norms (Flodgren et al., 2011). It is important to note that 
the relative impact of sources of intrinsic motivation has a bearing on the effect of 
financial incentives, and these may vary across providers and settings 
(Brocklehurst et al., 2013). 
3.2 METHODS OF PROVIDER PAYMENT IN PRIMARY CARE AND 
DENTISTRY 
3.2.1 Overview 
Essentially, there are three primary means of reimbursing providers in primary 
care settings; fee-per-item or fee-for-service (FFS), capitation and salary. Under 
FFS, providers receive a payment for each item of service provided. FFS payments 
are tied directly to the amount of services provided, which promotes productivity 
(Kristiansen and Mooney, 1993). FFS also ensures that access to care is 
guaranteed, as providers have a direct incentive to see more patients (Jegers et 
al., 2002). However, FFS may also create incentives towards demand inducement 
on the part of providers. As FFS payments are retrospectively administered, the 
uncertainty associated can generate considerable costs for the payer. FFS typically 
does not offer incentives to improve quality or efficiency or to deliver care that 
has a low profit margin, such as preventive services or patient education 
(Steinbrook, 2009). 
 
Under capitation, the provider is paid a fixed fee for the delivery of healthcare 
services to each registered individual. The payment is usually weighted by 
characteristics that influence the need for healthcare such as age and gender, and 
is generally paid prospectively. Capitation payments give providers an incentive to 
attract and compete for patients, and to introduce preventive measures 
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(Christianson and Conrad, 2011). Providers are also incentivised to investigate 
alternative methods of provision, such as the use of less expensive staff to provide 
less complex medical services (Robinson, 2001). Capitation may contribute to cost 
containment by reducing the delivery of unnecessary services and, as financial risk 
is transferred to providers, is an attractive method from the perspective of 
governments concerned with escalating healthcare costs. However, if payments 
to providers are not appropriately risk-adjusted for differences in morbidity, 
capitation may encourage providers to engage in ‘cream-skimming’ by selecting 
only those patients who are expected to generate a low workload (Gosden et al., 
2001). Similarly, ‘skimping’ on care and ‘dumping’ of high-need patients may also 
be observed (Ellis, 1998).  
 
In general, salary payments involve a fixed amount of money for a specified time 
period, thus providing basic income security for providers. Costs are contained as 
expenditure is known ex ante. Salary payments are administratively easy, and 
encourage the provider to contain costs (e.g. by offering preventive healthcare 
services) (Gosden et al., 2000). On the negative side, as the link between payment 
and performance is weak, salary payments provide incentives for providers to 
reduce workload in the same manner predicted by capitation payments. Providers 
have limited opportunities to increase their income (unless allowed to practice 
privately), which can reduce motivation and effort (Gress et al., 2006). Given the 
complexity of the incentives generated by each of these three methods of 
provider payment, choosing between payment methods can be interpreted as a 
balancing between the conflicting objectives of cost control, quality and access 
(Blomqvist, 2011). 
 
Indeed, in light of these trade-offs, many countries are now experimenting with 
mixed or blended methods which include a capitation or salary component as well 
as FFS or block payments for the provision of certain services (out-of-hours, house 
calls, etc.). In particular, ‘pay for performance’ (P4P) elements are being 
introduced to provider payment schemes in an effort to reward performance that 
is consistent with health policy objectives (the UK Quality and Outcomes 
Framework component of the GP contract is a well-known international example) 
(Roland and Guthrie, 2016). Although assuming a variety of forms, the common 
characteristic of P4P programmes is the deliberate adoption of explicit payment 
incentives associated with metrics for specific objectives, such as higher quality 
processes of care that follow evidence-based guidelines, increased provision of 
preventive services, better management of chronic diseases, better patient 
outcomes, etc. (Cashin et al., 2012). Underlying population need also in part 
determines the choice of most appropriate method; there is some evidence that 
patients with low needs are best served by capitation, while patients with high 
needs are best served by FFS (Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2011). 
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A recent innovation in healthcare payment is the use of ‘bundled payment’ 
methods. The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality in the US define 
‘bundled payment’ as a method by which payments to healthcare providers are 
related to the predetermined expected costs of a grouping, or ‘bundle’ of related 
healthcare services (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2011). 
‘Bundling’ therefore refers to the degree to which the components of healthcare 
are grouped together for payment or paid for separately. Bundled payments may 
involve single or multiple providers, with most recent applications of bundled 
payments targeting care coordination across multiple providers. High quality care 
for patients with chronic and complex conditions often involves coordinating 
between multiple providers and sources of care. A practical example of a bundled 
payment would be where a single fee is paid for an entire episode of care; for 
example, a single fee for hip replacement would cover both the procedure itself 
and the rehabilitation and follow-up treatments. This fee would be divided among 
the providers along the care pathway, either prospectively or retrospectively. To 
date, bundled payments have predominated in settings where the objective is to 
promote care coordination across healthcare settings and between healthcare 
providers. i.e. generally only found in acute settings, or in primary care settings 
that involve coordination with acute services. In most cases, providers are 
typically given discretion over the allocation of the services used to treat the 
patient’s episode most effectively. 
In 2011 in the US Medicare began a new initiative to expand the ‘bundled 
payment’ concept to link payments for multiple services that patients receive 
during an episode of care (Altman, 2012). These initiatives have occurred 
alongside initiatives in the private sector; see Friedberg et al. (2015) for a 
review.12 Across Europe payments are generally only bundled for care in the acute 
care setting (hospitals) and then often only for one episode of care with 
associated outpatient and follow-up activity often being billed separately 
(Charleston et al., 2012).13 
12 On October 1, 2013, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation officially launched the Medicare Bundled 
Payment for Care Improvement initiative, a federally-funded initiative mandated by the Affordable Care Act. The 
Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services have committed to tying 50 per cent of Medicare payments to these 
new alternative payment models by the end of 2018. They hope that by paying for related care as part of a broad 
payment bundle, different providers that treat a patient during a single episode will have incentives to better 
coordinate care, avoid unnecessary services, and improve patient health outcomes (Cassidy, 2015). 
13 Diagnosis-related groups, or DRGs, are a common payment model for inpatient care, in which hospitals are paid a 
single payment for specific healthcare events exclusive of professional (physician) fees. In contrast, bundled care 
payment models include a single payment for all acute- and post-acute care associated with a hospitalisation or 
event, inclusive of professional fees. In Ireland, the prospective funding project for primary total hip and total knee 
replacements commenced as a pilot for activity-based funding in 2011. This initiative implemented prospective 
funding for primary hip and knee replacements (four diagnosis-related groups (DRGs)) in seven hospitals initially, 
with a further five hospitals joining six months later as a result of the success of the initial pilot. The hospital budget 
was reduced by an amount of money related to the four DRGs, and this portion of the budget was ‘earned’ back, 
based on work carried out in the hospital. By creating a single price for the individual case (DRG), the responsibility 
moved to the hospital, so as to ensure that its costs were managed within this price. This required greater clinician 
engagement, enhanced financial management in hospitals and the development of sustainable ‘patient-level costing’ 
10 | Reforming the  Del ivery  of  Pub l i c  Den tal  Serv ices in  I reland  
 
In terms of provider incentives, bundled methods of payment may exert 
downward pressure on the unit costs of delivering an episode of care, but they 
also create incentives to increase the number of cases treated. Although this may 
indirectly improve access to necessary care, the number of unnecessary services 
and overall costs also may increase (Cashin et al., 2012). Under prospective 
payment, services are bundled for payment purposes, creating incentives for 
providers to limit the services they provide in response to a specific event or 
illness episode. However, unlike capitation, providers receive more revenue the 
greater number of episodes they treat (Christianson and Conrad, 2011). 
 
Several types of undesired effects of bundled payments have also been 
postulated. The most significant potential undesired effects include underuse of 
effective services within the bundle, avoidance of high-risk patients, and an 
increase in the number of bundles reimbursed (increasing health spending). 
Providers under bundled payment may ‘game’ the system by changing coding 
practices to maximise payment for the bundle (‘upcoding’) or by moving services 
in time or location to qualify for separate payments (‘unbundling’) (Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality, 2011; Porter and Kaplan, 2016; Conrad, 2015). 
One significant concern with bundled payment methods is that providers may 
achieve savings not just by forgoing wasteful or redundant care but by not 
furnishing needed care or choosing the cheapest alternative (Cassidy, 2015). 
3.2.2 Empirical evidence in primary care 
In terms of empirical evidence, a number of systematic reviews of provider 
remuneration in primary care have been undertaken (Giuffrida et al., 1999; Scott 
et al., 2011; Gosden et al., 2000; 2001), with results generally in line with the 
theoretical predictions (e.g. FFS leads to a higher quantity of primary care services 
compared with capitation and salary provider payment methods). A common 
finding was the poor quality of the evidence available with which to identify the 
causal effect of provider payment on the outcomes of interest (e.g. health 
expenditure, patient outcomes, service quality, etc.). For example, Flodgren et al. 
(2011), who conducted an overview of four systematic reviews that evaluated the 
impact of financial incentives on provider behaviour and patient outcomes, found 
evidence that while financial incentives may be effective in changing provider 
behaviour, the evidence had serious methodological limitations, with limited 
generalisability outside of the particular study contexts. 
 
The quality of the evidence is also an issue in learning from previous international 
experience with P4P schemes. For example, Nolan et al. (2011) reviewed the 
 
                                                          
 
processes (Casemix Ireland, 2012). The National Clinical Programme for Trauma and Orthopaedic Surgery estimated 
that over 9,000 bed days were saved in a one-year period as a result of the pilot (HSE, 2015). 
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international evidence on P4P and assessed its potential applicability in the Irish 
context. They highlighted the poor quality of evidence on P4P schemes, stemming 
partly from technical challenges inherent in evaluating P4P schemes (e.g. lack of a 
control group). Notwithstanding these technical difficulties, they concluded that 
the available evidence does not provide a clear answer to the question of whether 
P4P should be implemented. Limitations identified included difficulties in 
obtaining valid performance indicators, unintended consequences (e.g. crowding 
out of intrinsic motivation on the part of providers), and the absence of evidence 
on cost effectiveness of P4P schemes. More recent overviews of P4P by Ogundeji 
et al. (2016) and Cashin et al. (2012) have confirmed that the evidence that P4P 
improves health outcomes, or even the quality of processes of care, is limited at 
best. 
 
In terms of empirical evidence on bundled payment methods, the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality reviewed 58 studies on bundled payments 
published between 1985 and 2011, largely from the US (Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality, 2011). In particular, they wanted to analyse what the 
evidence showed on the effects of bundled payment versus usual (predominantly 
FFS) payment on healthcare spending and quality measures. They found that, in 
general, the transition from a cost-based or FFS reimbursement to bundled 
payment was associated with a decline in spending of 10 per cent or less. Bundled 
payment was also associated with a decrease in the utilisation of services included 
in the bundle, often measured as reductions in length of stay or utilisation of 
specific services. However, the introduction of bundled payment was associated 
with inconsistent and generally small effects on quality measures. Most of the 
studies reviewed were single-setting (usually in-patient) that replaced FFS 
reimbursement systems in Medicare or other public insurance systems. They 
highlighted that the strength of the evidence on bundled payments was low, 
reflecting the difficulty in evaluating large-scale policy interventions that occur in 
a rapidly-changing healthcare environment. They noted that the most rigorous 
study designs were usually feasible only when policymakers planned for an 
evaluation experiment in the course of experimentation. 
 
Focusing on the one application included in the Agency for Healthcare Research 
and Quality Review that was relevant outside of a hospital setting, Rosenthal 
(1999; 2000) examined the impact of a contracting change within a managed 
behavioural health organisation in the US providing outpatient mental healthcare 
services, from a FFS system to a case-rate system, with utilisation management 
delegated to providers. The contracting change resulted in a 25 per cent reduction 
in mental health visits per episode. The effect varied with the amount of payment 
and was more pronounced for providers with a larger share of revenue from risk 
contracts and with intensive utilisation management programmes. They found no 
evidence of patient selection on the part of participating providers, i.e. selecting 
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low risk patients. However, they noted that the effects may be biased upwards, as 
providers who chose the new contracting arrangements may have been very 
different from those who remained on the existing FFS contracts. Unfortunately 
they could not assess the impact of the contracting change on outcomes other 
than utilisation, such as patient health, and noted that spill-over effects on 
pharmacy and other primary care costs were possible. 
3.2.3 Empirical evidence in dental care 
Brocklehurst et al. (2013) undertook a systematic review of different methods of 
provider payment (i.e. FFS, salary, capitation, blended) on the level and mix of 
activities provided by primary care dentists and the impact on patient outcomes. 
Based on the findings from two randomised control trials (RCTs) conducted in the 
UK (Clarkson et al., 2008; Coventry et al., 1989), they concluded that financial 
incentives as part of remuneration systems may produce changes to clinical 
activity undertaken by primary care dentists, although the quality of the evidence 
available was poor. They therefore recommended further experimental research, 
with particular attention paid to the impact of provider payment on patient 
outcomes. 
 
A number of other studies have examined the impact of provider payment on the 
behaviour of dentists, albeit using non-experimental evidence. For example, a 
series of papers from Norway examined the impact of a policy change in 2000 
whereby all dentists in one county were given the opportunity to change their 
contract from a fixed salary contract to a combined per capita and fixed salary 
contract. Comprehensive data were collected before and after the change. They 
found that the transition led to an increase in the number of individuals 
registered with each dentist without either a fall in quality or a patient selection 
effect (Grytten et al., 2009; 2013). 
 
In 2006 the existing FFS system for National Health Service (NHS) dental 
healthcare services in England and Wales was replaced by three ‘course of 
treatment’ payment bands. As a result many items of treatment that previously 
carried different fee levels were paid the same amount. Tickle et al. (2011) carried 
out a descriptive analysis of treatment trends before and after the introduction of 
the new dental contract. They found that dentists shifted activity towards 
treatments where rewards were high relative to costs, i.e. the mix of service types 
changed rapidly with services that required less dentist time (e.g. extractions) 
‘replacing’ services that required more dentist time (e.g. fillings). Chalkley et al. 
(2010) evaluated the impact of the change by comparing activity in England and 
Wales with a sample of control dentists in Scotland where the contract did not 
change. They found that dentists who were previously on FFS contracts did not 
display a statistically significant response to the shift to activity-based payment, 
but dentists who were previously on quasi-employment contracts exhibited a 
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statistically significant increase in their public service provision. Focusing on the 
Scottish situation, where dentists are reimbursed either via salary or via a 
predominately FFS system, Listl and Chalkley (2014) found that a significantly 
higher utilisation of examinations was observed if dentists were paid FFS 
compared with salary, but this was largely accounted for by the characteristics of 
dentists themselves rather than the payment method.14  
 
More recently in Northern Ireland, Hill et al. (2017) compared outcomes in 13 
practices paid by capitation with those in 57 control practices paid by FFS along a 
number of dimensions (patient selection, service coverage, type and mix of 
treatments, and system financial viability). They found evidence that the 
capitation practices were significantly less likely to register older people and 
patients exempt from payment charges (both groups would be expected to have 
higher dental healthcare needs). They also found that capitation practices saw a 
smaller proportion of their registered patients and provided treatment courses 
that were of lower monetary value, although there was no evidence that they 
‘underserved’ their patients in the form of differences in the average number of 
treatments provided per registered patient. There was evidence of differences in 
treatment mix between the two sets of practices with capitation practices 
providing fewer examinations, fillings and scale and polishes, but more extractions 
than FFS practices. However, there was no difference in the extent of preventive 
activity (i.e. fluoride varnishes and fissure sealants) between practices. There 
were no differences in mean monthly payment charge revenue between 
practices. In Ireland, Woods et al. (2010) examined the impact of a change in the 
administration and remuneration arrangements under the DTSS in 1999. Using 
data from the PCRS over the period June 1996 to April 2005, they found that there 
was a substitution away from extractions towards amalgam fillings following the 
fee increase for amalgams (from €20.33 to €33.72) in 1999. 
 
Focusing on P4P initiatives in dentistry, Cornejo-Ovalle et al. (2015) evaluated the 
impact of a P4P programme (as an addition to the existing salary payment) among 
dentists in Santiago, Chile on care provided to 6-year-old children over a five-year 
period spanning the introduction of P4P incentives (2006-2010). They found that 
on average, when P4P was implemented, there was a significant increase in 
activity when compared to the time period in which P4P was not used. Voinea-
Griffin et al. (2010) reviewed a number of P4P schemes in the US that attempted 
to link remuneration to provider performance in dental care; they found limited 
evidence of effectiveness, partly due to the lack of rigorous evaluations of existing 
P4P programmes. In addition, they discussed the difficulty in measuring quality in 
dental care, an issue that must be addressed before P4P initiatives can be 
 
                                                          
 
14  In a related study, they found that after controlling for differences in patient need and dentist-specific preferences, 
self-employed dentists (i.e. those paid largely on a FFS basis) treated patients who were exempt from payment more 
intensively than their salaried counterparts (Chalkley and Tilley, 2006). 
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considered in dental care. Grytten (2017) also highlighted the difficulty in 
implementing P4P in dental care, in the absence of agreed clinical indicators of 
the severity of dental diseases. 
 
With the exception of the studies by Chalkley et al. (2010) and Tickle et al. (2011) 
which evaluated the move to a predominately activity-based reimbursement 
system in the NHS in the late 2000s (which has similarities with bundling), there is 
little published research of a bundled payment system in dental care. However, 
there are some examples of emerging initiatives in non-acute settings that 
provide some initial suggestive evidence on the possible effects of bundled 
payment methods in these settings. For example, de Bakker et al. (2012) and 
Struijs and Baan (2011) carried out an evaluation of a 2007 bundled care 
programme in diabetes care in the Netherlands15 and found that the introduction 
of bundled payments and care groups had both positive and negative effects, as 
well as some unintended consequences (e.g. potential conflicts of interest 
between care organisations who were also GPs providing services). The positive 
consequences were better collaboration, better process quality (e.g. adherence to 
protocols), and more transparency. The negative consequences were dominance 
of the care groups by GPs, large price variations that were only partially explained 
by differences in the provision of care (suggesting that providers had very 
different interpretations of the services included in the bundle, i.e. ‘stinting’ on 
care), and administrative burden (e.g. in apportioning payments across providers). 
The effects on patient outcomes such as blood sugar levels and costs were 
unknown. 
3.3 SUMMARY 
In terms of provider payment in primary care (and dentistry), the optimal mix 
between FFS, capitation and salary is still open to question. It is important to 
recognise that no single payment method can achieve all desired policy objectives 
as there are trade-offs involved in favouring one method over another. It is also 
important to note that the extent to which providers are influenced by the way in 
which they are paid is dependent on the strength of the different factors 
motivating their behaviour (e.g. self-interest, patients’ interest, medical ethics, 
etc.). 
 
 
                                                          
 
15  The diabetes example was subsequently extended (on a voluntary basis) in the Netherlands in 2010 to care for other 
chronic conditions such as chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD). In the diabetes application, health insurers 
paid a single fee for a principal contracting organisation (a new legal entity called a care group) to cover all elements 
of primary care for patients with diabetes. Care groups consisted of multiple healthcare providers and were generally 
owned by GPs. The main objective of the programme was to reduce fragmentation in care across providers of care. 
Services in the care bundles were fully covered by the basic insurance that is mandatory for all Dutch citizens, which 
meant that these services required no additional payment from patients. Care standards specified only the treatment 
activities; in an attempt to encourage competition among providers, the standards did not specify the discipline of 
the provider who should provide the care. 
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While P4P components are attractive and many countries have experimented 
with various different P4P initiatives, their success is dependent on the accuracy 
with which outcomes can be measured. In particular, the difficulty in measuring 
clinical outcomes in dentistry has been highlighted (Grytten, 2017). In an effort to 
overcome some of the limitations of capitation or similar prospective payment 
methods, many countries are now experimenting with bundled payment 
initiatives. Initially, they have been developed in acute settings in order to 
improve care coordination across multiple providers of care. As these initiatives 
are still in the development or pilot phase in many countries, they have not yet 
been subject to rigorous evaluations of their impacts on efficiency, access, quality 
and patient health outcomes. 
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CHAPTER 4  
 
Costing dental healthcare services (adult medical cardholders) 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
As noted, the National Oral Health Policy proposes the reorientation of services 
for adult medical cardholders under the DTSS with a new focus on preventive 
services (Department of Health, 2018b). Table 4.2 sets out the existing list of 
treatments and fees payable to dentists under the DTSS, while Table 4.1 
summarises the alternative dental healthcare services proposed under the new 
policy.16 The purpose of this section is to outline the data and methods used to 
assess the public expenditure implications of providing an alternative preventive 
dental healthcare package to adult medical cardholders. Estimates are provided 
for a range of alternative scenarios that reflect uncertainty in key assumptions 
(e.g. around population take-up), future technological developments (e.g. phasing 
out of mercury fillings) and policy parameters (e.g. frequency of recommended 
services).  
 
TABLE 4.1 PROPOSED DENTAL HEALTHCARE SERVICES FOR ADULT MEDICAL CARDHOLDERS 
Dental Treatment 
Oral examination including assessment of hard and soft tissue for oral cancer, oral surgery, orthodontics; 
radiographs/scans; biopsies; prescriptions 
Prophylaxis (scale and polish) 
Fissure sealants 
Fluoride varnish 
High fluoride prescription toothpaste 
 
Source: Department of Health (2018b). 
 
 
                                                          
 
16  The alternative preventive dental healthcare packages contain some services that are reimbursed under the current 
FFS arrangement (e.g. amalgam fillings), while others are new (e.g. fissure sealants). See also Table 4.2. Not all 
services are preventive per se, and so the packages may be considered as reflecting a set of preventive and core 
services. 
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TABLE 4.2 EXISTING TREATMENTS AND SCHEDULE OF FEES UNDER THE DTSS (ADULT 
MEDICAL CARDHOLDERS) 
Treatment € 
Oral examination 33.00 
Prophylaxis 31.00 
Restoration/filling (amalgam) 50.06 
Restoration/filling (composite – six anterior teeth only) 51.88 
Exodontics (extraction under local anaesthetic) 39.50 
Surgical extraction – maximum 2 units:  
  Fee payable for each 15 minute unit 35.00 
  Maximum payable 70.00 
First stage endodontic treatment (anterior teeth only) 57.30 
Denture repairs:  
  First item of repair 47.86 
  Each subsequent item 15.34 
  Maximum payable 78.54 
Apicectomy/amputation of roots 168.70 
Endodontics (anterior teeth only) 137.66 
Protracted periodontal treatment per visit (max 4) 26.36 
Miscellaneous (e.g. haemorrhage or prescriptions only) 22.65 
Prosthetics  
  Full upper or lower dentures (other than edentulous persons) 326.22 
  Partial upper or lower acrylic denture  239.27 
  Complete upper or lower recline 130.59 
  Complete upper and lower recline 217.38 
Full upper and lower dentures (edentulous persons only) 478.74 
 
Source:  PCRS (2016b). 
 
4.2 DATA AND METHODS 
In order to assess the implications for public expenditure on the proposed 
package of services for adult medical cardholders, a number of pieces of 
information are necessary (see Table 4.3): 
1. Price per unit of each service in the preventive care package; 
2. Eligible population for each service; 
3. Proportion of eligible population who may be expected to avail of the service; 
4. Usage frequency of each service (e.g. one oral examination per annum). 
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TABLE 4.3 TREATMENT PRICES, ELIGIBLE POPULATION, TAKE-UP AND USAGE FREQUENCY FOR 
BASELINE SCENARIO (ADULT MEDICAL CARDHOLDERS) 
Preventive Dental 
Treatment 
Price per 
unit 
€ 
Eligible Medical Card 
Population 
Take-Up 
% 
Usage 
Frequency  
Oral examination including 
assessment of hard and soft 
tissue for oral cancer, oral 
surgery, orthodontics; 
radiographs/scans; biopsies; 
prescriptions 
33.00 
Aged 16-24 
n=170,146 30.9 Annual 
Aged 25-69 (‘low risk’)1 
n=739,650 
30.9 Biennial 
Aged 25-69 (‘high risk’)1 
n=100,861 30.9 Annual 
Aged 70+ 
n=333,466 30.9 Annual 
Prophylaxis (scale and 
polish) 31.00 
Aged 16+ (non-edentulous) 
n=1,233,682 30.9 Annual 
Fissure sealants 50.062 Aged 16-24 n=170,146 30.9 
One treatment 
during age 
range 16-243 
Fluoride varnish 22.65 
Aged 65+ (non-edentulous) in 
non-fluoridated areas4 
n=51,087 
30.9 Annual 
High fluoride prescription 
toothpaste 22.65 
Aged 16-24 and 65+  
(non-edentulous) in  
non-fluoridated areas4 
n=78,310 
30.9 Annual 
 
Sources:  See Section 4.2 for further details. 
Notes: 1. The Department of Health estimate that 88 per cent of the 25- to 69-year-old age group are ‘low risk’, i.e. requiring one oral 
examination every two years, and 12 per cent of the 25- to 69-year-old age group are ‘high risk’, i.e. requiring one oral 
examination every year (Department of Health, personal communication, 13 February 2017). 
2. The cost of a fissure sealant treatment is based on the fee for an amalgam filling, €50.06 (Department of Health, personal 
communication, 2 November 2016). 
3. It is assumed that eligible individuals will need to avail on one fissure sealant treatment during the nine-year period from age 
16-24 (Department of Health, personal communication, 13 February 2017).  
4. Data on the proportion of the population living in fluoridated areas are taken from O’Sullivan and O’Connell (2015). Using 
data from the 2006 Census of Population, they report that 84 per cent of households have fluoridated water supplies.  
 
Where possible, we use data for 2015. Data on the price per unit of each 
recommended service, and on the eligible population for each service, are 
sourced from the PCRS Statistical Analysis of Claims and Payments 2015 (PCRS, 
2016b).17 The eligible population for prophylaxis, fillings, fluoride varnish and high 
fluoride prescription toothpaste excludes the estimated 25.7 per cent of the over 
65s Medical Card population who are edentulous, and who are assumed will not 
need these services.18 In addition, not all eligible individuals will be expected to 
 
                                                          
 
17  Price per unit is sourced from ‘Scale of Fees Payable under the Dental Treatment Services Scheme as at 31 December 
2015’ (p.208). See also Table 4.2 of this report. Numbers of medical cardholders are sourced from Table 7 (pp. 30-35). 
18  The Oral Health of Irish Adults 2000-2002 study reported an edentulous rate of 45.6 per cent among over 65 medical 
cardholders in 2000-2002; see Table 3.2 in Whelton et al. (2007). The data were collected from a detailed clinical oral 
examination. The Department of Health have produced projections of edentulous rates out to 2046, using data on 
past trends in edentulous rates. Three alternative assumptions about the annual rate of decline in edentulous rates 
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avail of the services offered. In 2015, 30.9 per cent of eligible medical cardholders 
availed of ‘above-the-line’ treatments under the DTSS, which includes oral 
examinations, prophylaxis, fillings, etc.19 We therefore assume that the eligible 
population is adjusted downwards to account for this average take-up.20 In 
sensitivity analyses (detailed below), we assess the implications for expenditure of 
varying the estimated take-up of preventive dental healthcare services under the 
DTSS.  
 
Data on the usage frequency of each service (e.g. one oral examination per 
annum) were provided by the Department of Health. For those aged 25-69 years 
of age who are deemed to be ‘low risk’, an oral examination every two years is 
recommended. For those aged 16-24, one treatment of fissure sealants (i.e. for 
two teeth) is recommended during that age range. Further details are provided in 
Table 4.3. For all other treatments, a usage frequency of once per annum is 
assumed. In further sensitivity analyses (detailed below), we model the 
implications for expenditure of changing the usage frequency of selected services 
to every two or every four years. 
4.3 SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
We then run a number of separate additional analyses to test the sensitivity of 
our estimates of public expenditure to variations in our underlying assumptions 
and policy parameters. For example, what is the impact of assuming greater take-
up of services under each preventive care package? What is the impact of 
requiring all fillings to be composite rather than amalgam? What is the impact of 
providing services on a biennial rather than an annual basis? 
 
We run six sensitivity analyses as follows: 
1. Assuming that all those eligible receive two treatments of fissure sealants per 
annum, rather than one treatment; 
2. Assuming increased take-up of services. The estimate of increased take-up 
we use is the proportion of those in the lowest income quintile who have at 
least one visit to a dentist in the last year (38 per cent), obtained from the 
2007 Survey of Lifestyles, Attitudes and Nutrition in Ireland (SLAN).21 
 
                                                          
 
(2, 4 and 6 per cent) are used in these projections. We use the figure for the midpoint scenario (i.e. an annual decline 
of 4 per cent), which results in a projected edentulous rate of 25.7 per cent in 2015. 
19  At the end of December 2015, there were 1,344,123 medical cardholders aged 16+ (i.e. eligible for the DTSS) (PCRS, 
2016b). At the end of December 2015, 415,557 of these individuals had availed of ‘above-the-line’ DTSS treatment in 
2015 (PCRS, 2016a), which equates to an average take-up rate of 30.9 per cent. 
20  We could of course model different levels of take-up for each service. However, the number of unique patients per 
treatment is not available from the PCRS but rather the number of unique ‘above-the-line’ and ‘below-the-line’ 
patients only. We therefore assume the average ‘above-the-line’ take-up applies for all treatments in the alternative 
preventive dental healthcare packages. 
21  See Table A3.4 in Devaux and de Looper (2012). 
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3. Assuming that the eligible population is entitled to an oral examination,
prophylaxis, fluoride varnish and high fluoride prescription toothpaste once
every two years;22
4. Assuming that the eligible population is entitled to an oral examination,
prophylaxis, fluoride varnish and high fluoride prescription toothpaste once
every four years.22
5. Assuming that one filling per annum is allowed.23
6. Assuming that one composite filling per annum is allowed.24
4.4 RESULTS 
We present first the results for the baseline scenario in Table 4.4. The estimated 
annual expenditure on the alternative preventive dental healthcare package is 
€23.0 million. Reflecting the proposed availability of these services to the majority 
of the population of adult medical cardholders on an annual basis, the costs of 
providing examinations and prophylaxis account for the largest components of 
total cost (€9.9 million and €11.8 million respectively). 
TABLE 4.4 BASELINE SCENARIO (ADULT MEDICAL CARDHOLDERS) 
€million 
Oral examination including assessment of hard and soft tissue for oral cancer, oral 
surgery, orthodontics, radiographs/scans, biopsies, prescriptions 9.9 
Prophylaxis (scale and polish) 11.8 
Fissure sealants 0.3 
Fluoride varnish 0.4 
High fluoride prescription toothpaste 0.5 
Total 23.0 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
Note: Underlying assumptions: Price per unit, eligible population, take-up and usage frequency as per Table 4.3. 
These estimates are most sensitive to alternative assumptions about the scope of 
services offered, and to a lesser extent by assumptions about take-up and the 
usage frequency of the specified services. Allowing for one filling per annum 
increases annual expenditure to €42.3 million. Assuming an increased take-up to 
38 per cent of the eligible population increases annual expenditure to 
22 The exception is fissure sealants where the recommended incidence does not change, i.e. one treatment during age 
range 16-24 years. 
23 We assume that the existing split between amalgam and composite fillings in 2015 applies (i.e. 65.5 per cent of all 
fillings under the DTSS in 2015 were amalgam, and 34.5 per cent were composites) (PCRS, 2016a). The relative ratio 
between amalgams and composites varies by age (e.g. from 80:20 in the 16- to 24-year-old age group, to 40:60 in the 
over 75s), but we take the average across all those aged 16+ here. 
24 The EU signed the Minamata Convention on Mercury in October 2013 and thereby committed to ensure its 
ratification and implementation across the Union.  
See http://ec.europa.eu/environment/chemicals/mercury/ratification_en.htm for further details [last accessed 7 
September 2018]. 
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€28.2 million. Assuming that eligible individuals (i.e. those aged 16-24) avail of 
two fissure sealant treatments rather than one treatment raises annual 
expenditure to €23.3 million. Assuming that the eligible population receives the 
specified services every two (four) years, rather than annually, reduces annual 
expenditure to €13.5 million (€6.9 million). The results of the sensitivity analyses 
are presented in Table 4.5. 
 
TABLE 4.5 ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS (ADULT MEDICAL CARDHOLDERS) 
 
 €million 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Oral examination including assessment of hard and soft 
tissue for oral cancer, oral surgery, orthodontics, 
radiographs/scans, biopsies, prescriptions 
9.9 12.2 6.9 3.4 9.9 9.9 
Amalgam filling     12.5 - 
Composite filling      6.8 19.8 
Prophylaxis (scale and polish) 11.8 14.5 5.9 3.0 11.8 11.8 
Fissure sealants 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Fluoride varnish 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.4 
High fluoride prescription toothpaste 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.5 
Total 23.3 28.2 13.5 6.9 42.3 42.8 
 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
Notes: Alternative scenario assumptions: 
1. Fissure sealants: two treatments (four fissure sealants), i.e. €100.12. 
2. Increased take-up among the eligible population, i.e. 38 per cent for all treatments. 
3. Usage frequency of all services (every two years). The exception is fissure sealants where the usage frequency does not 
change, i.e. one treatment during age range 16-24 years. 
4. Usage frequency of all services (every four years). The exception is fissure sealants where the usage frequency does not 
change, i.e. one treatment during age range 16-24 years. 
5. Allowing for one filling per annum, assuming the existing (2015) split between amalgam and composite fillings, i.e. 65/35. 
6. Allowing for one filling per annum, assuming all fillings are composites. 
  
Combining the data in Tables 4.1 and 4.3, it is possible to generate indicative 
estimates of the cost of the care packages for particular population groups. The 
results of this exercise are presented in Table 4.6 and illustrate that, for example, 
the cost of the provision of a preventive dental healthcare package to a 16- to 24-
year-old medical cardholder in a non-fluoridated area would be €92.21 per 
annum. The variation across age groups and areas reflects the variation in the 
scope of services recommended for each group. For example, a dentist treating a 
young adult living in a non-fluoridated area would receive €92.21 per annum for 
the provision of services to this young adult, in comparison to the €69.56 they 
would receive for a similar young adult living in a fluoridated area. 
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TABLE 4.6 APPROXIMATE PACKAGE PAYMENT BY AGE GROUP (BASELINE SCENARIO, ADULT 
MEDICAL CARDHOLDERS) 
Age Group Fluoridated Area € 
Non-Fluoridated Area 
€ 
16-24 69.56 92.21 
25-64 (low risk) 47.50 47.50 
25-64 (high risk) 47.50 92.80 
65-69 (low risk) 64.00 64.00 
65-69 (high risk) 64.00 109.30 
70+ 64.00 109.30 
 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
Note: Price per unit, eligible population, take-up and usage frequency as per the baseline scenario (see Table 4.3 for included 
services). 
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CHAPTER 5  
 
Costing dental healthcare services (children) 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Under the National Oral Health Policy, it is proposed to have an assessment of 
each child’s oral health in the first two years of life, and to offer an expanded 
preventive and curative dental healthcare package at three key age ranges (2-5, 6-
11 and 12-15) (Department of Health, 2018b). It is envisaged that services will be 
delivered in independent dental practices (akin to the DTSS), and that dental 
practitioners would enter into contract with the HSE to provide these services. 
The scope of existing service provision for children up to 16 years of age under the 
Public Dental Service (PDS) is outlined in Table 5.1. Under the proposed system, 
dentists would be reimbursed for a package of services as outlined in Table 5.2.  
 
 
TABLE 5.1 EXISTING TREATMENTS FOR CHILDREN UNDER THE PUBLIC DENTAL SERVICE (PDS) 
 
Age Group Treatment 
All children 5-12 Three assessments, with referral for further treatment if necessary 
All children 0-15 Emergency care 
 
Source: Department of Health (2018b). 
 
TABLE 5.2 PROPOSED DENTAL HEALTHCARE SERVICES FOR CHILDREN 
 
Age Group Dental Treatment Delivery Setting 
0-1  
(i.e. up to 2nd birthday) Assessment Independent practice 
2-5 
(i.e. up to 6th birthday) 
Examination Independent practice 
Filling Independent practice 
6-11 
(i.e. up to 12th birthday) 
Examination Independent practice 
Filling Independent practice 
Fissure sealants Independent practice 
Fluoride therapy Independent practice 
12-15 
(i.e. up to 16th birthday) 
Examination Independent practice 
Filling Independent practice 
 
 
Source: Department of Health (2018b). 
 
 
As in Section 4, the purpose of this section is to outline the data and methods 
used to assess the public expenditure implications of providing an alternative 
preventive dental healthcare package to children. Estimates are provided for a 
range of alternative scenarios that reflect uncertainty in key assumptions (e.g. 
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around population take-up), public health advice (e.g. provision of fluoride 
therapy to young children) and policy parameters (e.g. frequency of 
recommended services). 
5.2 DATA AND METHODS 
As with the analysis for adult medical cardholders, in order to assess the 
implications for public expenditure on these alternative packages of services for 
children, a number of pieces of information are necessary (see Table 5.3): 
1. Price per unit of each service; 
2. Eligible population for each service; 
3. Proportion of eligible population who may be expected to avail of the service; 
4. Usage frequency of each service (e.g. one assessment before the child’s 
second birthday). 
 
Data for 2015, or the nearest available year, are used. Data on the price per unit 
of each recommended service are sourced from the PCRS Statistical Analysis of 
Claims and Payments 2015 (PCRS, 2016b).25 In sensitivity analysis, detailed below, 
we consider the implications of changing the price per unit by changing the skill 
mix for the delivery of certain services, e.g. from a dental surgeon to a dental 
hygienist or nurse. 
 
Data on the eligible population are sourced from the Central Statistics Office 
(CSO). For some services, the eligible population is a subset of the entire 
population in that age range. For example, fluoride therapy is assumed to be 
available only to those residing in non-fluoridated areas. Data on the proportion 
of households living in non-fluoridated areas are taken from O’Sullivan and 
O’Connell (2015), using data from the 2011 Census of Population. Similarly, not all 
children will need to avail of interventions such as fillings; we use data from the 
Fluoride and Caring for Children’s Teeth (FACCT) study of 5- and 12-year-olds in 
Dublin, Cork and Kerry in 2013/2014, to restrict the eligible population for fillings 
to those children with at least one decayed, missing or filled tooth (DMFT>0).26 
 
 
                                                          
 
25  Price per unit was sourced from ‘Scale of Fees Payable under the Dental Treatment Services Scheme as at 31 
December 2015’ (p.208) (PCRS, 2016b).  
26  Tooth decay levels in children are best described using a measurement called the decayed, missing or filled tooth 
(DMFT) index. This measurement counts the number of teeth which are decayed (D), missing (i.e. extracted due to 
decay) (M), or filled due to decay (F). For young children with primary teeth only, the convention is to use lower case 
letters (dmft). For older children with permanent teeth only, the convention is to use upper case letters (DMFT) 
(Whelton et al., 2006). In this report, we use the term DMFT to refer to both DMFT and dmft.  
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TABLE 5.3 TREATMENT PRICES, ELIGIBLE POPULATION, TAKE-UP AND USAGE FREQUENCY FOR 
BASELINE SCENARIO (CHILDREN) 
Age Group1 Dental Treatment1 
Price per 
unit2 
€ 
Eligible 
Population 
(description)1 
Eligible 
Population 
(n) 
Take-Up3 
% 
Usage 
Frequency 
for Age 
Group1 
0-1 
(i.e. up to 2nd 
birthday) 
Assessment 33.00 All children 0-1 130,435 83.1 Once 
2-5 
(i.e. up to 6th 
birthday) 
Examination 33.00 All children 2-5 280,389 83.1 Twice 
Filling 51.88 All children 2-5 with DMFT>04 83,276 83.1 Twice 
6-11 
(i.e. up to 12th 
birthday) 
Examination 33.00 All children 6-11 404,772 83.1 Three times 
Filling 51.88 All children 6-11 with DMFT>04 134,384 83.1 Twice 
Fissure 
sealants 50.06 All children 6-11 404,772 83.1 Twice 
Fluoride 
therapy 22.65 
All children 6-11 
in non-fluoridated 
areas5 
64,764 83.1 Three times 
12-15 
(i.e. up to 16th 
birthday) 
Examination 33.00 All children 12-15 246,702 83.9 Twice 
Filling 51.88 All children 12-15 with DMFT>04 90,540 83.9 Twice 
 
Source: See Section 5.2 for further details. 
Notes:    1. Data on the proposed treatments for each age group, and the recommended usage frequency for these treatments, were 
provided by the Department of Health (Department of Health, personal communications, 20 September 2017; 22 November 
2017; 24 November 2017; 27 November 2017). 
2. Prices per unit for assessment/examinations, extractions, fillings and fluoride therapy are sourced from the current schedule of 
fees payable to dentists under the DTSS; see p.208 of PCRS (2016b) for details. The cost of a fissure sealant treatment (two 
teeth) is based on the fee for an amalgam filling, €50.06 (Department of Health, personal communication, 2 November 2016). 
3. Data on the expected take-up of services are sourced from Wave 1 (nine years of age) and Wave 2 (13 years of age) of the Child 
Cohort of the Growing Up in Ireland study of children. The proportion of children at nine years of age with at least one dental 
visit over a two-year period is used to proxy average take-up of children up to the age of 12, while the proportion of children at 
13 years of age with at least one dental visit over a two-year period is used to proxy average take-up in children over the age of 
12.  
4. Data on the proportion of children with at least one decayed, missing or filled tooth (DMFT) are used to proxy the number of 
children who may be expected to avail of fillings. These data are sourced from data provided by the Department of Health from 
the Fluoride and Caring for Children’s Teeth (FACCT) study of 5- and 12-year-olds in Dublin, Cork and Kerry in 2013/2014 
(Department of Health, personal communication, 20 September 2017).  
 
 
Not all eligible individuals will be expected to avail of the services offered. For 
each age range, the core preventive service (assessment/examination) is to be 
provided approximately once every two years. In the baseline scenario, we use 
data from the Growing Up in Ireland (GUI) survey, which records the proportion of 
children who visited a dentist at least once in the previous two years. The data 
show that 83.1 per cent of children aged nine years of age, and 83.9 per cent of 
children aged 13 years of age had visited a dentist at least once over the past two 
years.27 We therefore assume that the eligible population is adjusted downwards 
 
                                                          
 
27  The relevant question (asked of the child’s primary caregiver, usually the mother) is ‘Which of the following best 
describes how regularly the Study Child visits the dentist? Responses are ‘at least once a year’, ‘Once every two 
years’, ‘Once every three years’, ‘Only when there is a problem’ and ‘Never/almost never’. We aggregate the 
proportions visiting ‘at least once a year’ and ‘once every two years’ to derive an estimate of the proportion of 
children who may be expected to visit a dentist within a two-year period. For children aged 0-1, 2-5 and 6-11, we use 
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to account for this average take-up. However, the GUI data refer to visiting rates 
which are self-reported, and which apply in the current financing model (i.e. with 
most individuals paying the full cost out-of-pocket). In sensitivity analyses 
(detailed below), we assess the implications for expenditure of varying the 
estimated take-up to consider alternative estimates of take-up from 
administrative data from the UK NHS. 
Data on the usage frequency of each service (e.g. one oral assessment during the 
age range 0-2 years) were provided by the Department of Health.  
5.3 SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
We then run a number of separate additional analyses to test the sensitivity of 
our estimates of annual expenditure to variations in our underlying assumptions. 
We run nine sensitivity analyses as follows: 
1. Assuming that the oral health assessment at age 0-2 may be carried out by
another professional such as a dental hygienist or nurse, at a lower unit cost.
We assume an alternative price per unit of €25 for this service;28
2. Assuming alternative take-up of services. The estimates of alternative take-up
we use are derived from data from NHS Scotland, which documents that the
proportion of children aged 0-17 who had visited a dentist in the previous
two years ranged from 81 per cent (for children aged 13-17) to 98 per cent
(for children aged 0-2);29
3. Assuming that fluoride therapy will also be made available to children aged 2-
5;30
4. Assuming that fluoride therapy will be made available to all children aged 2-5
and 6-11, regardless of their residence in a fluoridated/non-fluoridated area;
5. Assuming one fissure sealant treatment in the age range 6-11, and one
fissure sealant treatment in the age range 12-15, rather than two in the age
the GUI visiting rate for nine-year-olds, while for children aged 12-15, we use the GUI visiting rate for 13-year-olds. 
GUI questionnaires are available from: http://www.esri.ie/growing-up-in-ireland/questionnaires [last accessed 7 
September 2018]. 
28 The alternative price per unit for an oral health assessment at age 0-2 was provided by the Department of Health 
(personal communication, 27 November 2017). 
29 Data from NHS Scotland for 2016 indicate that 98.3 per cent of children aged 0-2, 89.2 per cent of children aged 3-5, 
84.4 per cent of children aged 6-12 and 80.6 per cent of children aged 13-17 had visited a dentist in the previous two 
years (NHS, 2016). 
30 Fluoride is a mineral that prevents tooth decay. Fluoride can be administered in different ways, either topically 
(toothpastes, mouth rinses, varnishes, gels) or systemically (fluoride supplements, fluoridated water, salt). Topical 
fluorides have been shown to be highly effective and the use of fluoride-containing toothpastes is now almost 
universal. When daily tooth-brushing with a fluoridated toothpaste is not carried out or when the caries-risk is 
increased, additional sources of fluoride can be recommended  (Tubert-Jeannin et al., 2011). However, the evidence 
for the appropriateness of fluoride therapy for young children (less than six years) is inconclusive (Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, 2001, Tubert-Jeannin et al., 2011, Wong et al., 2010). 
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range 6-11. This alternative scenario reflects the high degree of variation in 
the eruption dates for first and second permanent molars, meaning that 
greater flexibility in assessment and treatment ages for fissure sealants is 
recommended;31 
6. Assuming that a subset of children aged 2+ years will require emergency 
treatment in the form of one extraction per age range;32 
7. Assuming that all children aged 2-5 will require two emergency prescriptions 
during that age range; 
8. Assuming that children should receive an assessment/examination once per 
annum; 
9. Using an alternative definition of DMFT to estimate potential need for fillings 
and emergency extractions.33 
5.4 RESULTS 
We present first the results for the baseline scenario for the package of services 
set out in Table 5.2 (results presented in Table 5.4). Annual expenditure for the 
provision of a primary dental care service to all children under the age of 16 years 
of age is estimated to be €26.5 million. For each age range, the oral examination 
accounts for the majority of the estimated expenditure, reflecting the 
recommendation that all children receive an oral examination approximately 
every two years. 
 
 
                                                          
 
31  Dental sealants were introduced in the 1960s to help prevent dental caries, mainly in the pits and fissures of occlusal 
(biting) tooth surfaces. Sealants act to prevent bacteria growth that can lead to dental decay. A recent Cochrane 
Systematic Review found that resin-based sealants applied on the occlusal surfaces of permanent molars are 
effective for preventing caries in children and adolescents (Ahovuo-Saloranta et al., 2017). However, there is 
considerable variability in the ages at which first and second permanent molars erupt. For example, a 2010 guidance 
study on pit and fissure sealants cites evidence from a number of European studies which show that the age range 
for permanent molar emergence is wide: from age five to eight for first permanent molars and from age nine to 15 
for second permanent molars (Irish Oral Health Services Guideline Initiative, 2010). Data from the National Health 
Examination and Nutrition Survey in the US also show wide variation in eruption ages, particularly for second 
permanent molars. They also find that eruption ages differ by sex and race (Pahel et al., 2017). To reflect this 
variability, in our alternative scenario, we assume that children aged 6-11 will avail of one fissure sealant treatment, 
while the remaining treatment will be carried out in the age range 12-15. The baseline scenario assumes that both 
fissure sealant treatments will be carried out in the age range 6-11. 
32  We use data from the Fluoride and Caring for Children’s Teeth (FACCT) study of 5- and 12-year-olds in Dublin, Cork 
and Kerry in 2013/2014 on the number of DMFT to calculate the proportion of children at ages 2-5, 6-11 and 12-15 
who may be expected to need an extraction. For example, for children aged 5, FACCT shows that there is an average 
of 1 DMFT, which equates to approximately 5 per cent of their total teeth at that age; we therefore assume that 
5 per cent of children aged 2-5 will potentially need an extraction. The proportions for children aged 6-11 and 12-15 
are estimated to be 3.75 per cent, and 2.5 per cent, respectively. 
33  In general in Ireland, the convention is to use D3cMFT (i.e. without visual caries), while the convention in the UK is to 
use D3vcMFT (i.e. with visual caries) (Whelton et al., 2006). This sensitivity analysis considers the implications of 
assuming higher cavity rates, by using data on D3vcMFT instead of data on D3cMFT (which is used in the baseline 
scenario). 
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TABLE 5.4 BASELINE SCENARIO (CHILDREN) 
 
Age Group Dental Treatment €million 
0-1 Assessment 1.8 
2-5 
Examination 3.8 
Filling 1.8 
6-11 
Examination 5.5 
Filling 1.9 
Fissure sealants 5.6 
Fluoride therapy 0.6 
12-15 
Examination 3.4 
Filling 2.0 
Total  26.5 
 
 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
Note: Underlying assumptions: Price per unit, eligible population, take-up and usage frequency as per Table 5.3. 
 
 
The results of the sensitivity analyses are presented in Table 5.5. These estimates 
are most sensitive to alternative assumptions about the frequency of 
assessments/examinations, and the relevant population for fluoride therapy. 
Assuming that all children should receive an assessment/examination once per 
annum raises expenditure substantially, to €41.1 million per annum. Allowing all 
children aged 2-5 and 6-11 to avail of the recommended course of fluoride 
therapy, regardless of their residence in a fluoridated/non-fluoridated area 
increases annual expenditure to €32.3 million. Two scenarios result in reduced 
expenditure. Reducing the price per unit for dental assessments at age 0-1 
reduces expenditure to €26.0 million, while changing the eligible age group for 
fissure sealants reduces expenditure to €26.3 million (as there are fewer children 
aged 12-15 than aged 6-11). 
 
The remaining scenarios have more limited impacts on annual expenditure. For 
example, changing the estimated take-up rates to reflect those currently observed 
among Scottish children increases expenditure to €27.2 million. Assuming that all 
2- to 5-year-olds living in non-fluoridated areas can avail of fluoride therapy (in 
addition to all 6- to 11-year-olds living in non-fluoridated areas) increases the 
estimated annual cost of the primary care programme to €26.9 million. Providing 
for one emergency extraction for at-risk children increases expenditure marginally 
(to €26.7 million), reflecting low rates of DMFT in Irish children at present.  
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TABLE 5.5 ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS (CHILDREN)  
  €million 
Age 
Group Dental Treatment (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
0-1 Assessment 1.4 2.1 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 3.6 1.8 
2-5 
Examination 3.8 4.1 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 7.7 3.8 
Emergency extraction - - - - - 0.1 - - 0.1 
Emergency prescription - - - - - - 2.6 - - 
Filling 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.3 
Fluoride therapy - - 0.4 2.6 - - - - - 
6-11 
Examination 5.5 5.6 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 11.1 5.5 
Emergency extraction - - - - - 0.1 - - 0.1 
Filling 1.9 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.4 
Fissure sealants 5.6 5.7 5.6 5.6 2.8 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 
Fluoride therapy 0.6 0.6 0.6 3.8 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
12-15 
Examination 3.4 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 6.8 3.4 
Emergency extraction - - - - - 0.0 - - 0.1 
Filling 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.4 
Fissure sealants - - - - 2.6 - - - - 
Total  26.0 27.2 26.9 32.3 26.3 26.7 29.1 41.1 28.1 
 
 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
Note: Alternative scenario assumptions:  
1. Lower price (€25) for the delivery of dental assessment to children aged 0-1 years of age. 
2. Alternative take-up rates among the eligible population, using data from NHS Scotland (NHS, 2016). 
3. Including fluoride therapy for children aged 2-5. 
4. Including fluoride therapy for all children aged 2-5 and 6-11, including those in fluoridated areas. 
5. One fissure sealant treatment to be provided at age 6-11 and one at age 12-15. 
6. Including additional treatment of emergency extractions for a subset of children potentially in need of an extraction. 
7. Including emergency prescriptions for children aged 2-5. 
8. Annual assessment/examination for all children. 
9. Using alternative definition of DMFT (i.e. D3vcMFT, including visual cavities) to assess potential need for fillings and 
emergency extractions. 
 
 
Combining the data in Tables 5.3 and 5.4, it is possible to generate indicative 
estimates of the cost of the treatment packages for different age ranges. The 
results of this exercise are presented in Table 5.6, and illustrate that, for example, 
the cost of the provision of a primary dental healthcare package to a 2- to 5-year-
old with no decay in a non-fluoridated area would be €66 (for that four-year 
period). Reflecting the greater range of services recommended for children in the 
age range 6-11, the estimated cost of a package of primary dental healthcare 
services for a child aged 6-11 with no decay in a non-fluoridated area would be 
€264.07 (for that six-year period). 
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TABLE 5.6 APPROXIMATE PACKAGE PAYMENT BY AGE GROUP (BASELINE SCENARIO, 
CHILDREN) 
 Fluoridated Areas Non-Fluoridated Areas 
Age Group DMFT=0 € 
DMFT>0 
€ 
DMFT=0 
€ 
DMFT>0 
€ 
0-1 33.00 33.00 33.00 33.00 
2-5 66.00 169.76 66.00 169.76 
6-11 199.12 302.88 264.07 367.83 
12-15 66.00 169.76 66.00 169.76 
 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
Note:  Price per unit, eligible population, take-up and usage frequency as per the baseline scenario (see Table 5.3 for relevant 
services).
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CHAPTER 6  
 
Summary and policy implications 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This report detailed the results of an analysis of the potential cost implications of 
proposed changes to aspects of the model of delivery of publicly-financed dental 
services in Ireland, as set out in the new National Oral Health Policy (Department 
of Health, 2018b). The analysis was carried out under the joint research 
programme between the ESRI and the Department of Health. The cost analysis 
was conducted to assist the Department of Health in assessing the feasibility and 
affordability of the recommendations outlined in the new policy and in 
ascertaining the parameters which are likely to have the largest impact on cost. 
While a number of alternative scenarios have been examined and a number of 
assumptions have been made to facilitate this analysis, this analysis was not an 
end in itself and it was not intended to draw conclusions about the anticipated 
final cost of the publicly-funded schemes of the new National Oral Health Policy. 
 
Three research questions were examined in this report: 
1. What is the national and international evidence on the effects of different 
methods of provider payment on dental healthcare provision and outcomes? 
2. What is the estimated cost per annum of providing alternative packages of 
primary dental healthcare services to all adult medical cardholders? 
3. What is the estimated cost per annum of providing alternative packages of 
primary dental healthcare services to all children aged 0-16? 
6.2 SUMMARY 
6.2.1 Provider payment methods 
Taking the first question, in order to assess the most appropriate payment 
method for the reimbursement of dentists for services provided in the public 
system, the report begins by reviewing briefly the theoretical and empirical 
literature on provider payment methods in primary care, and dentistry in 
particular. The review highlights that the optimal mix between the main methods 
of provider payment – namely capitation, FFS and salary – is still open to question. 
No one payment method can achieve all desired policy objectives as there are 
trade-offs involved in favouring one method over another. The choice of payment 
method in part depends on the importance of different policy priorities such as 
access, efficiency and quality. 
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New payment initiatives such as P4P are being implemented in many countries, 
but their success is dependent on the accuracy with which outcomes can be 
measured. In particular, the difficulty in measuring clinical outcomes in dentistry 
has been highlighted (Grytten, 2017). In an effort to overcome some of the 
limitations of capitation or similar prospective payment methods, many countries 
are now experimenting with bundled payment initiatives, initially largely in acute 
care settings. As these initiatives are still in the development or pilot phase in 
many countries, they have not yet been subject to rigorous evaluations of their 
impacts on efficiency, access, quality and patient health outcomes.  
6.2.2 Costing alternative preventive dental healthcare packages 
The assessment of the expenditure implications of alternative preventive dental 
healthcare packages resulted in a range of annual expenditure figures for both 
adult medical cardholders and children. For example, the annual cost of a package 
of care under the baseline scenario for adult medical cardholders is estimated to 
be €23.0 million, with estimates under alternative scenarios ranging from 
€6.9 million to €42.8 million. Annual expenditure for the provision of a primary 
dental care service to all children under the age of 16 years of age is estimated to 
be €26.5 million, with estimates under alternative scenarios ranging from 
€26.0 million to €41.1 million.  
 
The range of estimates presented in Sections 4 and 5 is designed to assist 
policymakers tasked with designing an alternative package of dental healthcare 
services, and associated provider payment structure, for adult medical 
cardholders and children respectively. However, it is important to highlight a 
number of caveats in interpreting these results. First, these are estimates of 
annual public expenditure for alternative packages of largely preventive care 
services only. For simplicity, and in order to isolate the effect of various policy 
parameters, we do not consider possible interactions between the different 
sensitivity analyses. In addition, the estimated cost of additional packages of 
services to cover medical interventions such as extractions, endodontic 
treatment, etc., and complex interventions such as crowns, bridges, etc. is not 
considered as part of the current study.  
 
Second, the analysis does not consider the capacity (i.e. staff, equipment, etc.) 
required to deliver alternative models of preventive dental healthcare to these 
two key population groups. In particular, the proposal to change the delivery 
setting for the provision of services to children from community dentists 
employed by the PDS to independent practitioners in the community represents a 
major change in how dental healthcare services for children will be delivered. The 
potential impacts on independent dental practice (or wider implications in terms 
of workforce planning, training, etc.) are not being considered here.  
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Third, the estimates are based on data for 2015. It is therefore a static analysis, 
assuming no behavioural or organisational change by individuals or providers as a 
consequence of a possible change in the package of primary dental healthcare 
services available, and associated provider payment methods. For example, for 
the analysis of children, we do not model the potential impact of improved oral 
health as a result of the alternative primary care package on future oral health 
needs, which may impact the frequency with which future cohorts of children may 
require particular services (e.g. fillings). In addition, we do not consider the 
potential impact of providers (dentists) responding to the new model of care for 
both adult medical cardholders and children, and associated provider payment 
methods, by changing their behaviour. Indeed, Woods et al. (2010) demonstrated 
that changes to the fee reimbursed for fillings and extractions under the DTSS in 
1999 led to significant changes in behaviour on the part of dentists.  
 
Fourth, we assume that unit costs of providing the various services to adult 
medical cardholders and children in independent practice are equivalent to the 
existing FFS reimbursement levels for these or equivalent services as set out in 
Tables 4.3 and 5.3. Ideally, the costing exercise would generate data on the most 
appropriate payment level for different treatments using data from a number of 
sources (e.g. provider unit costs, patient needs, cost effectiveness of 
interventions, etc.). In the absence of the availability of all these data in the Irish 
context at present,34 the current costing exercise has adopted a simplified 
approach, using data on the price of each service (proxied by the current FFS 
price).  
 
Finally, how do these estimates compare with current expenditure on publicly-
financed dental services for adult medical cardholders and children? Focusing on 
the case of adult medical cardholders, the baseline scenario results in estimated 
annual expenditures of €23.0 million (€42.3 million if an additional provision for 
one filling per annum per eligible individual is allowed). In comparison, in 2015, 
expenditure on ‘above-the-line’ treatments under the current DTSS totalled 
€48.1 million and expenditure on ‘below-the-line’ treatments totalled 
€18.3 million. A direct comparison between the estimated annual expenditure on 
an alternative package of preventive dental healthcare services with existing 
expenditure on ‘above-the-line’ treatments is not appropriate. A similar costing 
exercise would need to be undertaken to assess the expenditure implications of 
providing additional packages covering more complex interventions such as 
crowns, endodontics etc. under the DTSS in order to predict total public 
expenditure on dental healthcare services for adult medical cardholders. 
 
                                                          
 
34  The current phase of the development of the Hippocrates model of healthcare demand and expenditure is gathering 
data, where available, on unit costs of care across a variety of care settings in Ireland (Wren et al., 2017). 
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Nonetheless, the availability of a range of estimates provides guidance to 
policymakers on the choices available in designing an alternative package of 
preventive dental healthcare services (in terms of included services, price, eligible 
population and usage frequency of each service). 
6.3 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
6.3.1 Provider payment methods  
In drawing implications for policy from the literature review of provider payment 
methods, a number of issues are relevant. First, it is important to note that the 
extent to which providers are influenced by the way in which they are paid is 
dependent on the strength of the different factors motivating their behaviour 
(e.g. self-interest, patients’ interest, medical ethics, etc.).35 In the Irish context for 
example, the fact that dentists providing publicly-financed services also operate in 
the private sector, providing services to non-medical cardholders on a FFS basis 
needs to be considered. Previous research has highlighted that the strength or 
otherwise of alternative provider payment methods depends on the extent to 
which providers are relying on this source of payment as their main source of 
income (Brocklehurst et al., 2013). In Ireland in 2013, it was estimated that just 14 
per cent of total expenditure on dental healthcare services (including 
orthodontics) was accounted for by the public sector (Wren et al., 2015). In 
addition, where providers face different payment methods for the provision of 
the same services to different population groups, this can generate an 
inconsistency in the incentives facing providers across different population groups 
which may lead to inequities in treatment (Brick et al., 2012). Under the National 
Oral Health Policy, dentists will (continue to) face different payment methods for 
different services and different population groups, and the full implications of 
these different payment methods and resulting incentives will need to be 
monitored carefully in the implementation of the new policy. 
 
While it is difficult to predict how dentists will respond to the changes in 
reimbursement proposed under the National Oral Health Policy, to the extent that 
the mix of services reimbursable under the DTSS will now change, this may be 
expected to result in differences in the mix of services provided by dentists. As 
noted, changes in reimbursement under the DTSS in 1999 led to significant 
changes in behaviour on the part of dentists. In addition, for the provision of 
services to adult medical cardholders, the movement from FFS to prospective 
 
                                                          
 
35  A large amount of experimental evidence from psychology shows that when an activity is driven by intrinsic 
motivation, such as professionalism, or pride in the quality of one's work, then adding a financial motive might 
undermine, or ‘crowd out’, intrinsic motivation. This reduces the incentive effect from monetary rewards. In the 
worst case, crowding out may lead to less activity rather than more. This would be the case if intrinsic motivation is 
high and the crowding-out effect is strong (Grytten, 2017). 
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payment will change provider incentives, although the full impact of the change is 
difficult to predict without also considering how patients will react. 
 
Indeed, the incentives built in to different provider payment methods may also 
be offset partly or fully by incentives on the demand side for individuals to use 
dentistry services (Brick et al., 2010; 2012). For example, for those without 
Medical Cards in Ireland, patient and provider financial incentives conflict in 
terms of the utilisation of dental care (patients pay the full cost out-of-pocket, 
while providers receive a FFS for each visit). This problem may be a particular 
issue with dentistry where the bulk of service delivery, in terms of volume of 
activity, is based on the regular attendance of asymptomatic patients. Therefore, 
characteristics of patients such as expectations and health literacy may be 
relatively more important in encouraging uptake of dental services (Brocklehurst 
et al., 2013). In addition, in the field of prevention, it has been noted that 
informing and incentivising patients may be as important as incentivising 
healthcare providers to provide screening or immunisation services (Cashin et al., 
2012). The interaction with incentives facing alternative providers may also be 
important. Taking the example of primary care, it has been noted that combining 
capitation payments for one set of providers (e.g. GPs) with FFS payments for 
another set of providers (e.g. specialists) runs the risk of excess referrals and 
‘dumping’ of patients (Saltman et al., 2005). In this context, it is also increasingly 
accepted that payment mechanisms need to be supported by non-price 
mechanisms, such as the setting and monitoring of clinical protocols (Robinson, 
2001; Birch, 2015). Furthermore, the administrative burden on patients, 
providers and funders associated with complex reimbursement and co-payment 
structures should not be underestimated, as well as the implications for 
transparency (Robinson, 2001). 
 
Finally, to the extent that the costs incurred result not merely from the effort of 
the provider but also from factors outside the provider’s control (e.g. 
macroeconomic conditions, patient behaviour, etc.), prospective payment 
methods such as capitation or bundling exposes the provider to new financial 
risks. Prospective payment rates can be adjusted for the expected severity of the 
patient’s condition (e.g. using age/sex adjustment of payment rates), but these 
adjustments may only account for a modest proportion of the variation in costs. 
The design challenge facing the payer is further complicated in contexts where the 
desired behaviour of the provider comprises a variety of different tasks, some of 
which can be more easily measured than others. Attempts to link payment to 
particular tasks may therefore lead to an overinvestment in the provider’s time in 
those tasks that are explicitly measured and rewarded, and an underinvestment 
elsewhere (Robinson, 2001). This issue has been highlighted as a particular 
problem for dentistry, where there is an absence of agreed clinical indicators of 
the severity of dental diseases (Grytten, 2017). 
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6.3.2 Costing alternative preventive dental healthcare packages 
The alternative preventive dental healthcare packages examined in this report are 
designed to illustrate the choices facing policymakers in the context of the 
development of a new national oral health policy. The various scenarios illustrate 
the impact of alternative choices around the recommended services, price, 
eligible population and recommended usage frequency of preventive dental 
healthcare services on estimated public expenditure. Factors not directly under 
the control of policymakers, such as take-up of services, are also considered. 
Estimates of the cost of the alternative preventive dental healthcare packages for 
particular population groups (presented in Tables 4.6 and 5.6) also illustrate the 
impact of these choices on expenditure levels under the alternative packages. As 
noted however, the analysis is a static one, assuming no behavioural or 
organisational change by individuals or providers as a consequence of a possible 
change in the package of preventive dental healthcare services available, and 
associated provider payment methods. Further modelling work would be required 
to assess the implications of the provision of alternative packages of preventive 
dental healthcare services to adult medical cardholders and children for future 
oral health needs, and how this may influence future expenditure, not only on 
preventive dental healthcare services, but also on medical and complex dental 
interventions (such as extractions, endodontic treatment, crowns, bridges, etc.). 
 
The range of estimates can be used by policymakers to assess the implications of 
changes to policy parameters such as unit price per service, population coverage 
and recommended usage frequency. For example, it is clear that changing the 
eligible population for particular services can lead to considerable differences in 
annual expenditure (e.g. allowing all children aged 2-11 to avail of fluoride 
therapy, regardless of whether their area is fluoridated). The costing method 
employed in this report may also be used to assess the implications of other 
proposals that may be forthcoming from the recent Sláintecare report which 
recommended a universal comprehensive package of dental healthcare services 
(Houses of the Oireachtas, 2017; 67). As noted, the developing Hippocrates model 
of healthcare demand and expenditure36 will, in time, be able to incorporate 
analyses such as these, and to consider the implications of behavioural change. 
 
Finally, a consistent theme running through the empirical literature on provider 
payment was the lack of appropriate study designs with which to evaluate the 
causal impact of provider payment on health policy objectives (e.g. cost control, 
access, activity, patient health outcomes, etc.) (Flodgren et al., 2011; Scott et al., 
2011; Nolan et al., 2011). In contemplating a policy change, it is important to 
collect data that would facilitate a rigorous evaluation of the policy change. In the 
 
                                                          
 
36  http://www.esri.ie/projects/research-programme-in-healthcare-reform [last accessed 7 September 2018]. 
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absence of a randomised control trial (RCT),37 this could involve the collection of 
data before and after the policy change on both a treatment group (e.g. those 
visiting dentists reimbursed under an alternative preventive healthcare contract) 
and a control group (e.g. those visiting dentists reimbursed under the existing FFS 
contract), thereby allowing the analyst to separate out the effect of the policy 
change from other secular changes over time that were common to both the 
treatment and control groups. In any case, introducing an alternative preventive 
dental healthcare package offers opportunities for enhanced data collection that 
can also facilitate the achievement of other objectives such as public health 
surveillance. Currently there is a requirement for dentists participating in the DTSS 
to provide additional information on oral health when claiming reimbursement 
under the DTSS (for example, after prophylaxis dentists were required to provide 
an assessment of periodontal health) (PCRS, 2006); such a requirement could be 
extended to other indicators of oral health as part of an alternative contract for 
the delivery of preventive oral healthcare services. 
 
                                                          
 
37  See Newhouse and Normand (2017) for a review of the issues involved in conducting RCTs in the area of health policy 
interventions. 
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